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“We March as an Order of National Socialist, Soldierly, 
Nordic Men”: Ideology, Soldiers and Civil-Military Relations 
in the Schutzstaffeln der NSDAP 
 
 
Klagenfurt, Adolf Hitler, Ehrenkompanie, Foto: Deutsches Bundesarchiv,  
Bild 183-H04436 / CC-BY-SA 
 
Vermin and serpents creep across the face of the globe, heralding the proli-
feration of their subhuman counterparts in Europe’s most cultured cities.1 A 
                                                          
1  Cf. Bundesarchiv NS 31/163 Bl. 13-36, slide lecture, “Das Judentum, seine blutsgebundene 
Wesensart in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart,” reprinted in: Jürgen Matthäus et al eds., Ausbil-
dungsziel Judenmord? ‘Weltanschauliche Erziehung’ von SS, Polizei und Waffen-SS in Rah-
men der ‘Endlösung’ (Frankfurt/Main, 2003) pp. 152-161. For further examples of racist ideas in 
official SS publications, see: Reinhard Heydrich, Wandlungen unseres Kampfes (Berlin, 1936); 
Dieter Schwarz, Das Weltjudentum: Organisation, Macht und Politik (Berlin, 1939); SS Haupt-
amt eds., SS Mann und Blutsfrage (Berlin, n.d.). On such methods of training in the Allgemeine 
SS and the other branches of the SS cf. Jürgen Matthäus, “Die ‘Judenfrage’ als Schulungsthe-
ma von SS und Polizei: ‘Inneres Erlebnis’ und Handlungslegitimation,” in Ausbildungsziel Ju-
denmord? pp. 35-86; Isabel Heinemann, “Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut”: Das Rasse- u. 
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swarthy, hirsute man with a waddling gait that bespeaks collapsed arches 
and unclean living contrasts to a tall, athletic Nordic figure with a lantern jaw, 
azure eyes and a soldierly bearing. Captured as slides, these images flicker 
in the half-light before a room of men in black uniforms on a weekend of 
para-military training in mid-1936. The lecture formed part of a curriculum in 
the perils of world Jewry and the principles of Nazi eugenics, to which Hei-
nrich Himmler, eager to inculcate Nazi racist ideas in the elite guard of the 
party, treated the part-time volunteers in the so-called Allgemeine SS in the 
first years of the III. Reich.2 
Perhaps with the lessons of such a slide lecture in mind, as well as having 
embraced racist ideas and violent habits from whatever source3, the men of 
the Allgemeine SS on 9 November 1938 later burned local synagogues and 
bashed in the heads of rather more than a handful of Jewish neighbors and 
                                                                                                                           
Siedlungshauptamt d. SS und die rassenpolitische Neuordnung Europas (Göttingen, 2003), pp. 
62ff; An overview of ideology in the armed SS within the history of ideas, European society and 
civil-military relations is: Bernd Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten: Die Waffen SS 1933-1945 
5
th
 ed. (Paderborn, 1995), pp. 25-78; and the essays in Ausbildungsziel Judenmord?, pp. 21ff; 
on Nazi ideology at arms and civil-military relations in Germany and Europe in a general sense, 
there has been an explosion of literature since the beginning of the 1990s: Omer Bartov’s, 
Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the III. Reich (Oxford, 1991) appeared before a Ger-
man debate of mid-decade on ideology and war concentrated on the so-called Wehrmachtau-
stellung, cf. Hannes Heer et al eds., Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941-1944 
(Hamburg, 1995); Rolf Dieter Müller et al eds., Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität (München, 
1999); Hamburger Sozialinstitut eds., Verbrechen der Werhmacht: Dimensionen des Vernich-
tungskrieges 1941-1944 (Hamburg, 2002); Detlef Bald et al eds., Mythos Wehrmacht: Nach-
kriegsdebatten und Traditionspflege (Berlin, 2001); tendentious and problematic is: Rüdiger 
Proske, Wider den Missbrauch der Geschichte deutscher Soldaten zu politischen Zwecken 
(Mainz, 1996). 
2  Once the SS had liberated itself from the SA from late-1934 to 1936, the so-called Allgemeine 
SS (made up in its majority by part-timers with full time territorial staff cadres) was distinguished 
from the para-military SS formations, SS Verfügungstruppe, as well as the armed warders of the 
concentration camp system in the SS Totenkopfverbände and, by 1938, from the Security 
Police/Gestapo/Sicherheitsdienst (SD) /Police organization. In addition to the sources in note 1, 
cf. Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP eds., Organisationsbuch der NSDAP 5
th
 ed. (München, 
1938), pp. 419-427; an excellent wartime analysis of the Allgemeine SS is: Supreme Headquar-
ters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Evaluation and Dissemination Section G-2 eds., The Allgemei-
ne SS (n.p. n.d.) reprinted 1985; the best treatment of how the puzzle of SS sub-entities com-
bined as a whole is: Robert Köhl, The Black Korps: The Structure and Power Struggles of the 
Nazi SS (Madison, 1983). 
3  Cf. Peter Merkl, The Making of a Stormtrooper (Princeton, 1980) pp. 160ff; Richard Bessel, 
Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism: The Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany, 1925-1934 
(New Haven, 1984), pp. 33ff; Enzo Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence (New York, 2003); 
Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the III. Reich (New York, 2004); pp. 217ff; Robert O. Paxton, 
The Anatomy of Fascism (New York, 2004), pp. 55ff.; Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience 
(Cambridge, 2004) pp. 221ff.; George C. Browder, “No Middle Ground for the Eichmann 
Männer,” in Yad Vashem Studies, XXXI Shoah Resource Center, The International School of 
Holocaust Studies, Jerusalem 2003, pp. 403-424. 
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fellow citizens. Less than a year after the Crystal Night pogroms, these men – 
now drafted into the army, or volunteers in the SS-at-arms or the police (itself 
under Himmler’s control) – formed the vanguard of racial annihilation that 
moved eastward to locales in Poland and thence, within eighteen moths, to 
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Here the violence against Jews that began 
even before Hitler had come to power on the streets of Berlin’s fashionable 
western precincts4 and engulfed German places of Jewish worship in late-
1938 transformed itself into a torrent of genocide. In the process, the part-
time volunteers of 1936 became soldiers of destruction in a world war that 
contained within it an ideal of a total war of ideology and whose chief goal 
was racist imperialism on the European continent5. The following study ana-
lyzes this instance of war and ideology in a single, but nonetheless highly 
important case. Specifically, how do ideas germinate within society and poli-
tics and then become inculcated in para-military and military personnel who 
then embark upon campaigns of race war and ethnic cleansing? Further, the 
essay at hand seeks to set the above questions within the field of civil-military 
relations theory as it has evolved in the last decade. In this connection, the 
present essay seeks to join to disparate fields of scholarly inquiry in the hope 
that such a comparison can be fruitful. The latter issue of civil-military theory 
requires elucidation at the outset. 
 
The study of civil-military relations and modern military institutions in central 
Europe returned to prominence in the early 1990s with the reform of state, 
society and arms in central and Eastern Europe6. How can this issue of public 
                                                          
4  Dirk Walter, Antisemitische Kriminalität und Gewalt: Judenfeindschaft in der Weimarer Repub-
lik ( Bonn, 1999) pp. 211-221.  
5  Among an ever growing literature, see: Götz Aly et al eds., Vordenker der Vernichtung: 
Auschwitz und die Pläne für eine neue Europäische Ordnung (Hamburg, 1991); Christopher 
Browning, Der Weg zur Endlösung: Entscheidungen und Täter (Bonn, 1998); Raul Hilberg, Die 
Vernichtung der europäischen Juden (Frankfurt, 1992). 
6  For two American classics of civil-military relations theory from the era of the early cold war, 
see: Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Harvard, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York, 1960). In the 
past decade, Huntington’s book became a best seller amid the defense and military reform 
efforts with the transformation of cabinets, parliaments, and general staffs east of the Elbe, 
along the Moldau, Danube and Vistula. For the literature since 1989 see, for instance, Mary-
Beth Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed 
Forces (Ann Arbor, 1999); Andrew Cottey et al eds., Democratic Control of the Military in Post 
communist Europe: Guarding the Guards (Hounds mills, 2002); Istvan Gyarmati et al eds., Post-
Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the US (Washington DC, 2002); 
Jeffrey Simon, Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations (Lanham/Boulder/New 
York, 2003); idem. NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study of Civil-
Military Relations (Lanham/Boulder/New York, 2004). The most incisive treatment of the theo-
ries of civil-military relations since 1989 is: Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army 
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policy and academic theory be related to the ideology of the SS? Superficial-
ly, the two issues appear to have nothing to do with each other; but this im-
pression is misleading when one considers that, since 11 September 2001, 
certain figures in public life have discovered a predilection for empires and 
pre-emptive war waged for ideological goals to counter an enemy creed, in 
turn, possessed of violence to assert its own breathtaking aims of a messianc 
redemption in blood and fire via the defeat of the West. The foregoing phe-
nomenon lies outside of the scope of this little essay, however, which treats a 
case study of civil-military relations and war from an earlier epoch of the 20
th
 
century and the field of theory and practice of the soldier and the state in a 
new Europe between 1989 and 2001. 
 
Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact system of civil-military relations at the 
beginning of the 1990s, theory in this field – especially as concerns central 
and eastern Europe – had become absorbed with technocratic, budget-
centric issues of democratic processes of government dominated by the 
accession procedures to NATO within “Partnership for Peace” and what has 
since became known under the rubric of “security sector reform.7” The latter 
procedure, which by the June 2004 Istanbul North Atlantic Council summit 
(in the wake of the alliance Enlargement of April 2004 of Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Slovakia) has reached a kind of 
climax within the epoch that dawned in the fall of 1989 – as opposed to that 
which exploded in the late summer of 2001. 
To be sure, the analysis that unfolds here draws much of its inspiration from 
the later, violent date in contemporary history. As far as such a technocratic 
focus of the 1990s on defense management goes, this civil-military effort has 
surely been necessary to fulfill the needs of policy in a moment of necessity, 
while central and eastern European have junked the institutions, customs and 
habits of the Soviet style of civil-military institutions and mastered how NATO 
procedures operate in peace. What began in the wake of the Soviet military 
retreat from central Europe, amid the attempt to fill derelict central European 
                                                                                                                           
(Oxford, 1997), pp. 1-19. Strachan takes an historical approach but also generalizes about 
problems of theory and practice of the 1990s as well. Of further note on matters of theory are: 
Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (New York, 
2002); Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment 
(Baltimore, 1999). 
7  On security sector reform as a category of theory in academic civil-military relations and its 
application to policy in the recent past and present, cf. Andrew Cottey et al. Introduction: the 
Challenge of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Postcommunist Europe, pp. 1-16 in Cottey 
et al. eds., Democratic Control of the Military, cited in note 6 above. On “Partnership for Peace” 
and its democratic civil-military dictates, cf. NATO Office of Information and Press eds., NATO 
Handbook (Brussels, 1999) pp. 81ff.; idem. NATO Handbook, (Brussels, 2001), pp. 61-95.  
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defense ministries and general staffs with new faces, bright ideas and best 
practices, has stumbled into an intellectual dead end. This state of affair 
grows more extreme as the war against terror, the “coalition of the willing,” 
and the strategic geography of “old” versus “new” Europe now comprise a 
zone of contention and possible strategic catastrophe from the Atlantic shores 
of North Africa, to the Sunni triangle of Iraq, to the Hindu-Kush and far beyond 
to a site in North America, Europe, Asia and Africa where the disciples of bin 
Laden and his imitators will next wield their weapons of terror. 
 
The technocratic paradigm of new civil-military relations theory in central Eu-
rope that came forth amid the peaceful interlude of the first half of the 1990s 
has led to a neglect of civil-military relations in war in its wider dimension of the 
past and present8. Instead of asking how ideology and warfare intersect – and 
what effect such a conjuncture has on soldiers and civilians generally – the 
analysis of democratic civil-military relations of the last decade tends rather to 
disregard the worst cases that arise from conflict in favor of legislative routine 
and the hum-drum programming, planning and budgeting of western defense 
management. In an effort to smash theoretical icons, some makers of theory 
have gone so far as to argue that the civil-military past in the Euro-Atlantic 
sphere has but little relevance to the character of soldiers and civilians in Eu-
rope.9 In view of the foregoing, a historically informed skeptic may assert, in 
fact, that theory and practice have drifted into a pernicious present-ism, made 
doubly problematic by the renewed need, once again for a new generation, to 
integrate the experience of war into civil-military relations theory. 
The revival of crisis as concerns democratic civil-military relations in the here-
and-now came slowly and in stages well before the late summer of 2001. Such 
first emerged in the episodes of the 1991-5 Bosnian war and later in the 1999 
NATO aerial bombardment amid coercive diplomacy against the Serbs in ex-
Yugoslavia. This trend, however, formed but a prelude once the September 
2001 terror assaults on the U.S. east coast ushered in a new phase of U.S.-led 
“coalitions of the willing” in the punitive expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq 
which made the civil-military events of the 1990s appear unproblematic by 
comparison. Soon there ensued vituperation between heads of state and 
diplomatic figures in Washington, Berlin and Paris about the ideological para-
meters as well as the ends and means of the war against terror.  
                                                          
8  The Cohen work on national command in crisis and war in western democracies represents 
an exception, cf. Cohen, Supreme Command, pp. 1-15; 225-248, but deals with the highest 
echelons of command and the political leader as strategist. These themes are important, but the 
focus herein concerns wars of ideology, empire and paramilitary formations. 
9  Comments at Swiss DCAF (Democratic Control of Armed Forces) symposium, “Building 
Expertise,” Geneva, Switzerland, December 2002  
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A re-thinking of matters of theory and application in this field must arise be-
cause wars of ideology, that is to say, wars waged for expansive, even total 
strategic goals have returned to the scene after the limited campaigns of 
peace enforcement and collective security of the 1990s. With the passage of 
time since the first weeks of national solidarity after 11 September 2001, 
phenomena of stress and strain have become all too visible in US and allied 
democratic civil-military relations after more than two years of war. The chi-
mera of easy victory by “transformed,” high-tech forces against bin Ladenists 
in the Pashtun redoubt and in the face of Iraqi “dead enders” in the Sunni 
triangle vanished in the face of reverses that began in the summer of 2003 
and accumulated in the course of 2004.  
These facts demand some modification of civil-military relations theory in the 
face of the war-torn present. At the same time, amid new thinking about the 
past century in which the centrality of the Nazi attempt to exterminate Eu-
rope’s Jews remains an ever more powerful a phenomenon, without doubt 
much can be gleaned from this past epoch that also speaks to the unhappy 
present. Although violent anti-Semitism forms but part of this analysis of 
nationalist ideology, soldiers and civil-military relations, one can hardly ig-
nore how this central feature of western civilization that has made a striking 
comeback since 11 September 2001 as hatred and violence against Jews 
forms an important part of bin Ladenist ideology. 
Surely one must take up again the new-old category of Weltanschauungskrieg, 
or what Jomini called “wars of opinion.”10 The Axis campaigns of imperial racial 
conquest in World War II form a natural point of departure. Far from being 
bloody curiosities of the distant past, the multi-layered interactions of ideology 
and warfare in World War II continue to reverberate through present conflict, in 
no small part because the relevant questions, though of pressing importance 
today, are no longer asked in scholarly or policy-making circles. The latter 
especially have grown over confident of the political effects of technology in 
war or have become too focused on a single national experience of the last 
third of the 20
th
 century past as the basis for strategic thought. While the vio-
lent era since September 2001 surely marks a new epoch in the history of war 
and democratic civil-military relations for the United States, the imperative to 
comprehend the truths of war and peace that lie beyond the confusion of the 
present requires comparisons of one case of soldiers and politics to another, 
                                                          
10  The term is drawn from the seminal work: Helmut Krausnick et al eds., Die Truppe des Wel-
tanschauungskrieges: Die Einsatzgruppen d. Sipo u. d. SD, 1938-1942 (Stuttgart, 1981). On 
ideology and war in the era of revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare and the implications of 
same for modern war generally, cf. R.R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Buelow: From 
Dynastic to National War”; John Shy, “Jomini”; Peter Paret, “Clausewitz,” in Peter Paret et al 
eds., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1986), pp. 91-119;143-213.  
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even if such an effort may strike some as polemical, for all analysis of war and 
military power requires just such a comparison.  
 
“Ich bin Soldat11,” thus began Ernst Röhm’s memoirs published four years 
before his untimely death in July 1934. His end in a Munich-Stadelheim pri-
son cell recalled rather more a Chicago gang-land execution than a hero’s 
demise on the battlefield, especially when one considers how figures in 
Hitler’s inner circle, in the regular army and Röhm’s subordinates in the SS 
joined hands to liquidate the homo-erotic, would-be Gneisenau-in-a-brown 
shirt and his lieutenants12. During the rise to power of the Sturmabteilung as 
the vanguard of the NSDAP from 1921 until 1934, Röhm had helped, in part, 
to create, and in turn was done in by, what one might describe here as SS 
ideology.13 In other words, to render this concept in shorthand, this creed 
comprised an integral nationalist dogma of militarism and the citizen-at-arms 
clad in a berserk mixture of death-cult hocus-pocus, body-beautiful scientific 
racism, Norse mythology and German romantic notions of the Middle Ages 
that belied the enormous destructive potential latent in this most aggressive 
form of Völkisch ideology. 
Little in the outward appearance of Heinrich Himmler in the troubled summer 
of 1934, when he aided Hitler execute the SA Stabschef, would have pre-
dicted the violent progress of such ideas in the decade to come. Beyond 
Röhm’s core ideal of a Nazi militia that would displace the Prussian-German 
army, the notion that germinated in the mind behind these squinting eyes 
and pince-nez relied on racial-ethnic-quasi-religious criteria of an elite guard, 
that is of a new model soldier of a very specific kind – versus dynastic con-
cepts of privilege and duty or liberal ideas of the citizen-at-arms. This con-
cept he carried to its extremity and fused it with a cult of violence via  
                                                          
11  Ernst Röhm, Die Geschichte eines Hochverräters, (München, 1934) 7
th
 ed. p. 9.  
12  On the events of 30 June 1934, see: Peter Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone: die Geschichte 
der SA (München, 1989) pp. 188-219; Heinz Höhne, Mordsache Röhm; Hitlers Durchbruch zur 
Alleinherrschaft, 1933-1934 (Reinbek, 1984); Immo v. Fallois, Kalkül und Illusion: die Macht-
kampf zwischen Reichswehr u. SA während d. Röhmkrise 1934, (Berlin, 1994). For the effect of 
this event on the SS, see: Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, pp. 84ff. 
13 Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, pp. 25ff.; on the origins of Himmler’s ideas especially as 
concerns the role of soldiers and proto-Nazi ideology, cf. Bradley Smith, Heinrich Himmler: A 
Nazi in the Making, 1900-1926 (Stanford, 1971), pp. 35ff. Also see: Josef Ackermann, Heinrich 
Himmler als Ideologe (Göttingen, 1970); Wegner asserts that SS ideology chiefly reflected 
Himmler’s thought, as well as the official statements of same in the SS Publizistik. The historio-
graphy of the so-called collective Täterbiographien contains no unitary theory as to how racist 
ideas were spread and ended up in genocidal acts. Cf. Browder, “Eichmann Männer,“ pp. 2-20; 
Gerhard Paul, Die Täter der Shoah: Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deut-
sche? (Göttingen, 2002); Yaacov Lozowick, Hitlers Bürokraten: Eichmann, seine willigen Voll-
strecker und die Banalität des Bösen (Zürich, 2000).  
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romanticism, meritocracy and technocracy on an expanding ideological, 
institutional and geographical scale. There existed, in Himmler’s mind, little 
difference between internal and external enemies on such diverse battle-
fields as a Berlin-Mitte street corner, the barracks square of a concentration 
camp, or simultaneously the rear area and forward edge of combat zone of 
the Russian front.14  
The additional figures in Röhm’s demise as Reinhard Heydrich, Theodore 
Eicke and Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich or who thereafter profited from his eclipse as 
Paul Hausser, likewise described themselves in Röhm’s soldierly terms at 
the time and thereafter15. The more one deepens oneself in the writings of 
SS figures during the III. Reich and especially in the literature of apologia 
that emerged after the defeat, which endures with remarkable strength16, one 
cannot help but be struck at the manner in which these men in black tunics 
mimicked Röhm and other brown-shirted soldiers of fortune in their procla-
mations of self-ethos. That is, to be soldiers of a once-again-mobilized Ger-
man nation on the march with the spirit of 1914; to undo the wrongs of 1918 
on the home front and the international system of states by force of arms; to 
be seized by the higher moral, political and social truths of the storm of steel; 
by rage at the humiliation of the war dead by the dictates of peace and an 
alien form of government imposed by outsiders; to restore the honor of those 
who had perished between 1919 and 1933 at the hands of the enemy-within 
and the supporters of same abroad; to wield a preemptive blow against all 
future foes inside the Reich and beyond its borders; and by the sum of all 
these deeds, to form a master elite of the Greater German Reich for centu-
ries to come. Thus would be restored a nobility based on superior race to 
dominate Europe and thereby undo all the ills that had followed since 1789, 
1848 and 1917 in the wake of liberalism and socialism. All this and more 
required a re-foundation of the nation at arms by the elite guard of the party 
on the basis of total war in the 20
th
 century so as to protect the Führer and 
Reich against all enemies. The above forms the point of departure for the 
study that follows. 
                                                          
14  Wegner, Hitlers politische Soldaten pp. 74-75.  
15  On the early military influences on Himmler, see: Smith, Himmler, p.47ff; for biograpical 
accounts of Heydrich ( a disgraced naval officer), Eicke (an ex-NCO), Dietrich (an ex-NCO) and 
Hausser (a professional soldier and ex-General officer), cf. Ronald Smelser et al eds., Die SS: 
Elite unter dem Totenkopf: 30 Lebensläufe (Paderborn, 2000), pp. 208-219; 147-159; 119-133; 
190-207, respectively; this work contains citations of recent historical works as well as the 
insight that few of these figures have scholarly biographies worthy of modern standards of 
research. 
16  For example, Paul Hausser, Soldaten wie andere auch: der Weg der Waffen-SS (Osnabrück, 
1966); Felix Steiner, Die Armee der Geächteten (Preus. Oldendorf, 1971); Wegner, Hitlers 
politische Soldaten, pp. 333ff. 
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One should, however, scarcely accept at face value Röhm’s “I am a soldier,” 
or Hausser’s “....soldiers like any other.” To be sure armies and soldiers 
played a central role in the formative biographies of all these men, but in the 
aspect that these institutions found themselves in the midst of exceptional 
crisis and change associated with the social and political crisis at the end of 
the 19
th
 century and the collapse of the international system at the dawn of 
the 20
th
 century. This crisis of mass politics and war in the machine age 
included phases of total war, national defeat, civil and social strife amid what 
finally was an unsuccessful transition to democracy as well as truncated and 
circumscribed military biographies for the figures under examination here. 
The foregoing represented but a prelude and a contrast to the development 
after 1933 of arms and the state in national socialism. Herein the SS played 
its role of hectic institutional growth and organizational metamorphosis from 
a tiny branch of the SA in 1925 to a state-within-a-state with the most diverse 
missions and functions of guardians of racial purity, internal security, as well 
as paramilitary and military elite formations. All of this transpired in some-
what more than a decade’s time. The sum of these phenomena meant that, 
prior to 1934 and the break-away of the SS from the SA, certain of these 
figures responsible for the formation of the SS idea of soldiering in its widest 
sense had often only been peripheral figures in professional military life. That 
is, their military biographies had not been unlike that of the figure who had 
made the NSDAP into a national power in the final phase of the first German 
republic, Adolf Hitler.17 This assertion does not suggest, however, that pro-
fessional soldiers, themselves, were invulnerable to the temptations of totali-
tarian politics. Far from it, in fact. The irony here as concerns the military 
self-image of Röhm, Himmler and Dietrich resides in this: the domestic and 
international political forces, which thrust these otherwise marginal figures to 
prominence in the brief period from the late-1920s until the early 1940s, also 
finally transformed beyond recognition the traditional political, social and 
cultural roles of the Prussian-German soldier. This epochal process re-
presents a significant development in 20
th
 century European civil-military 
                                                          
17  Manfred Koch-Hillebrecht, Hitler: Ein Sohn des Krieges-Fronterlebnis und Weltbild (München, 
2003), pp. 157ff as well as collective biographies in Smelser et al eds., Die SS: Elite unter dem 
Totenkopf. On the decline of German military institutions as a result of total war and the disap-
pearing barriers between professional soldiers and the people at arms, see: Wolfgang Sauer, 
“Die Reichswehr,” in Karl-Dietrich Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik (Villingen, 
1955), pp. 205-256; Michael Geyer, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare,” in Peter 
Paret et al eds., Makers of Modern Strategy, (Princeton, 1986), pp. 537ff.; idem. “People’s War: 
The German Debate About a Levee en Masse in October, 1918,” in Daniel Moran et al eds., 
The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution (Cam-
bridge, 2003), pp. 124-158; Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Armee und III. Reich, 1933-1939 (Pader-
born/1987), pp. 11ff. 
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relations in the era of integral nationalism, mass politics, industrialized, total 
warfare and disintegrating societies18. That is, Röhm, Himmler, Eicke and 
Hausser’s idea of the soldier per force reflected the proliferation of organized 
violence in the era of machine warfare and in the radicalization of German 
nationalism at the dawn of 20
th
 century19. In their fashion, the above figures 
claimed to be heirs of the soldiers of German unity in the era 1807 to 1918; 
but, in fact, through their actions, they severely damaged, if not wholly oblite-
rated, the lines of continuity and tradition by force of totalitarian ideology that 
resulted in a war of racial conquest. To be sure, the above figures can but 
poorly function in the view of this century, as they once did immediately after 
war’s end as the alibi of a nation; but none can deny that these men essen-
tially destroyed whatever boundaries existed between professional soldier, 
secret policeman, ideological racist zealot, and executioner. Figures in the 
SS accelerated a process already ongoing as concerns the union of mass 
politics, large peacetime armies on the machine model, and the domestic 
and international consequences of German strategic failure in the era 1916-
1918.20 
 
By soldier, these men, in fact, meant “political soldier,21” a phrase that came 
from the lexicon of the radicalized and leveled German nationalist camp of 
the 1920s.22 This idea born in the chaos of defeat, civil strife amid the flou-
rishing of fascism and totalitarianism has considerable implications for those 
interested not only in the history of soldiers, politics and society in National 
Socialism, but the character of civil-military relations in a more general 
sense. The concept of “political soldier” of the era 1918-1945 must be lodged 
against Hausser’s apolitical idea – “Soldaten wie andere auch” – and that of 
other self-serving apologists who grasped at the legacy of “immortal soldierly 
virtues” within the context of the Federal Republic of the 1950s and early 
1960s.23 With memories all too short, these men sought to forget or to deny 
                                                          
18  In addition to sources in note 17, on civil-military relations in the age of total war in the first 
half of the 20
th
 century, see: Donald Cameron Watt, Too Serious a Business: European Armed 
Forces and the Approach of the Second World War (Berkeley, 1975), pp. 31-58; Stig Förster, 
An der Schwelle zum Totalen Krieg: die militärische Debatte über den Krieg der Zukunft, 1919-
1939 (Paderborn/München, 2002). 
19  Wegner, Hitlers politische Soldaten, pp. 36-38. Charles Sydnor, Soldaten des Todes: Die 3. 
SS-Division ‘Totenkopf,’ 1933-1945 (Paderborn/München, 2003), pp. 284-299.  
20  Geyer “German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare,” cited in note 17 above.  
21  Wegner, Hitlers politische Soldaten, pp. 36ff.  
22  Ibid. On the radicalization of German right wing thought in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centu-
ries, see. Stefan Breuer, Ordnungen der Ungleichheit: die deutsche Rechte im Widerstreit ihrer 
Ideen, 1871-1945 (Darmstadt, 2001), pp. 105ff. 
23  Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German 
Armed Forces (Princeton, 1988); Norbert Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik: die Anfänge der 
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the core fact that the SS took up the political-soldier, street-fighter/semi-
criminal reality of the SA and carried this practice to new locales amid new 
methods. While the appearance of the latter organization and its diverse 
facets may have superficially differed from those at its foundation (i.e. racial 
selectivity, concept of an elite, links to higher social strata) but this violent, 
street-fight, meeting-hall brawl heritage remained essential to the character 
of what was to follow in the years 1934-1939 in the further evolution of the 
SS, even if this heritage was grafted to ideals of racial technocracy, and 
existing state institutions of power. How could such be otherwise with the 
events of 30 June 1934 Putsch against Röhm, a kind of big bang of criminal 
practice present at the creation of the armed SS formations? This collective 
amnesia about the events from 1934 on operated amid the general re-
interpretation of soldierly ethos and civil-military relations which unfolded in 
the 1950s amid the consolidation of the Bonn republic, the integration of ex-
Nazi sub groups into West German society, the altercation over veterans’ 
benefits, and the establishment of the Bundeswehr. 
No one has better understood the essential meaning of the “political soldier” 
as applied to the subject of this essay as Bernd Wegner in his magisterial 
work on the Waffen SS24. Crucial here is how the reality of the political sol-
dier visible in the evolution of the SS reflected the eradication of what until 
the era 1890-1918 had been the boundaries between civil society and mili-
tary institutions; further, the distinction of such spheres has been crucial to 
the ethics and ethos of traditional German soldiers of the era as well as to 
theory about civil-military relations into the present.25 While the idea of citi-
zen-in-uniform had antecedents in revolutionary and napoleonic Europe and 
was championed by European socialists before 1914, Germany’s mob iliza-
tion for total war in the last phase of the conflict and the spread of armed 
violence at home more generally in the wake of defeat had brought a new 
reality to this idea after 1916. The sum of these developments represented a 
milestone in what lay ahead until 1933. In the first instance, after 1918 the 
founders of the Freikorps had put armed forces into private hands and thus 
further proliferated the battle line into the streets of the home front, whence it 
did not vanish even when normalcy came to the first German republic by 
                                                                                                                           
Bundrespublik und die NS-Vergangenheit (München, 1996); Ulrich Brochhagen, Nach Nürn-
berg: Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Westintegration in der Ära Adenauer (Hamburg, 1994).  
24  Wegner, Hitlers politische Soldaten, pp.13ff. 
25  Wegner, Hitlers politische Soldaten, pp. 84ff. Civil-military relations theory since 1989 has 
made much use of Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of 
Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, 1957), which contains an analysis of German civil-military 
relations from 1700 ‘til 1957 that stands a half century behind modern scholarship, cf. pp. 98-
124, and hence offers a problematic basis for theoretical analysis in the 21
st
 century. His inter-
pretation diverges sharply from the argument presented herein.  
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192426. In the process, as Wegner argues, this vanguard of Nazism greatly 
aided the formation of a quasi-military “grey zone,” in German society, which 
became a fertile ground for the later growth of the SS. This grey zone further 
distinguished itself as a realm in which war and peace also became merged 
in a state of permanent mobilization against an ongoing threat, even though 
at a given moment, to an outsider on the corner of the Linden and the Frie-
drichstrasse, peace seemed to reign in Berlin. In the second instance, as the 
first German democracy struggled to establish itself, domestic politics increa-
singly became channeled through para-military echelons as the leading po-
litical parties transformed what had been veterans organizations or the like in 
the era before 1914 into private armies for civil war. In this vein, in the post-
war years, in which democratic forces tried to assert their role, various polit i-
cal parties with paramilitary formations resisted them with the idea that plura-
listic politics should give way to a “state of front fighters,” or in the view of 
Erich Ludendorff, a society and state on the basis of the people’s community 
ala 1914 and the ethical basis of the army as it had existed before 1918.27 
 
The concept of the politically mobilized front-fighter on guard against the 
enemy-within constituted but one feature of the cosmos of ideas included in 
SS beliefs.28 To be sure, Himmler and his followers seized upon other con-
cepts that diverged sharply from what is commonly described elsewhere as 
a traditional soldierly ethos. Such ideas included the Ordensgedanke, that is, 
the aspiration of SS ideologues to constitute a national socialist knighthood 
on the pattern of the feudalistic, chivalric orders of the middle ages as well 
as that of the Society of Jesus of the era of the counter-reformation. The 
latter entity, in particular, was seen by SS thinkers as an especially danger-
ous institution because of its resistance to the Nazi march to power and the 
consolidation of same after 193329; hence, in Himmler’s view especially, the 
SS should emulate the Jesuits in their vertical structure, their role as the 
avant garde for an idea on the march and the subordination of the individual 
to the whole. Further, the German Order, in its manner from the era of feudal 
Europe and a society of estates, constituted an ideal for the SS as the em-
bodiment of the unity of statesman and soldier, as well as the union of state 
                                                          
26  On the political conditions in which the Freikorps emerged, cf. Heinrich August Winkler, 
Weimar, 1918-1933: Die Geschichte der ersten deutschen Demokratie (München, 1993), pp.80-
82; on their further development, James Diehl, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany (Bloo-
mington, 1977). 
27  Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten As in note 26. On Ludendorff, see: Geyer, “Machine 
Warfare,” pp. 548-554; Erich Ludendorff, Der Totale Krieg (München, 1935), pp. 11ff. 
28  Wegner, pp. 40-41. 
29  Wolfgang Dierker, Himmlers Glaubenskrieger: Die SD d. SS u. seine Religionspolitik, 1933-
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and nation derived organically from the community of race. All this stood in 
contrast to the civil-military experience of central Europe since 1848, where, 
to Nazi minds, the dogma of constitutionalism had first weakened and then 
crippled soldiers in the state. In this didactic vision, the knights of the order, 
moreover, gave birth to the ethos of the Prussian officer corps about which 
more is said below. The German Order also anticipated, at least in the minds 
of SS thinkers, Nazi ideas of the political soldier embarked upon imperial 
conquest and the spread of order and culture in the eastern marches of the 
Reich and beyond into the heart of the Slavic zone and the glacis of Asia. 
While virile knights and warrior-monks loomed in the firmament of the past, 
such virtues as loyalty, obedience and bravery as central aspects of the SS 
idea stood visible in the present for all to see in the regalia of the black 
corps. In order that an SS Mann never forget his oath as well as his readi-
ness to scorn death, such phrases as “Meine Ehre heißt Treue,” – first 
coined in 1931 at the time of the Stennes revolt30 – were immortalized by 
Hitler and subordinate figures responsible for Nazi aesthetics on cap 
badges, belt buckles and dagger blades31. More was in play here with such 
militaria than costume drama kitsch suited for the movie sets of Babelsberg, 
however. The SS achieved an utterly modern “brand name” recognition via 
the use of political symbols of dubious taste, but enormous political power 
and astonishing endurance well beyond 1945. 
The emphasis on soldierly loyalty must be put into a civil-military context of 
the era 1890-1945, if this idea is to make any sense. In the years before the 
Nazis came to power, German soldiers in the first republic had celebrated 
their unbreakable bond to the military world of the estates and dynastic hon-
or as the basis of their claim to power in the state and prestige in society32. 
The maintenance of tradition as a symbol of the soldierly ethos had been a 
means to recover from defeat and to re-establish professional standards in 
an army that had been swallowed up by the vortex of civil war. That is, this 
doctrine sought to render the self image of the soldier and his ethos a polit i-
cally exclusive catalog of martial virtues – contrasted to those of the bour-
geois or working class and to raise the standards of professional military life 
amid political turmoil and constitutional upheaval. This cult of military tradi-
tion figured prominently in Seeckt’s answer to the half-hearted constitutional 
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and pluralistic attempt, finally, to impose democratic civilian control upon the 
armed forces in the first republic. Such an emphasis on the soldierly herit-
age, and on past and future battle field glories – set off from society and at 
odds with a parliamentary form of government – all damaged the army. This 
practice distorted civil-military relations, scarred the ethos of the German 
soldier and made them more liable to the Lorelei appeal of extremist politics 
with disastrous consequences. Most important though, this organized polit i-
cal nostalgia for a mythical world within the general soldierly ethos exerted 
an appeal outside of military garrisons and made its way into such paramili-
tary organizations as the SA and the SS. Here was added the element of 
scientific racism and nordic historicism to the existing catalog of martial vir-
tues. In this vein, the claim by Hausser that the armed SS adhered wholly to 
the same standards as German professional soldiers appears ever more 
tendentious. To be sure, this line of argument hardly suggests that all Ger-
man soldiers were criminals and murderers; although, granted what one 
knows today, surely far too many were, but not all. Such an inflated generali-
zation does violence to the complexity of the historical record and engages 
themes and scholarship too vast for consideration here in depth33. 
 
The foregoing might only be of scholarly interest to historians of 20
th
 century 
central Europe, had not the specter of war of ideology and the shadow of 
total war of a new, virulent kind reappeared at the dawn of the 21
st
 century. 
The case of the SS and civil-military relations allows for certain theoretical 
generalizations of an unexpected kind that might interest those students of 
war beyond 20
th
 century history. In the first instance, the gravity of the to-
day’s strategic crisis and the paucity of insightful analysis all argue for a civil-
military reappraisal of the violent present.34 Such an analysis must perforce 
include an assessment of what can go wrong with the soldier in the state 
when the boundaries between the sphere of the war waged by of military 
professionals and defense technologists versus that waged by paramilitaries, 
free-booters, mercenaries, irregulars, fighters, guerillas, insurgents, and ter-
rorists. Such war gives way to a proliferation of conflict for all encompassing 
                                                          
33  Among an ever greater literature, cf. Manfred Oldenburg, Ideologie u. militärisches Kalkül: Die 
Besatzungspolitik d. Wehrmacht i.d. Sowjetunion 1942 (Köln/Weimar, 2004); Andrej Angrick, 
Besatzungspolitik u. Massenmord: Die Einsatzgruppe ‘D’ i. d. südlichen Sowjetunion, 1941-
1943 (Hamburg, 2003); Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius Kriegsland im Osten: Eroberung, Kolonisie-
rung u. Militärherrschaft im Ersten Weltkrieg (Hamburg, 2002). 
34  Among older works which looked forward to 11 September 2001 and what might follow, see: 
Ekkehard Lippert et al eds., Sicherheit in der unsicheren Gesellschaft (Opladen, 1997); Philip 
Delmas, The Rosy Future of War (New York, 1995); more recent: Lennart Souchon ed., Neue 
Herausforderungen an Operative Führung aus Sicht der Wissenschaft u. d. Streitkräfte in 
Clausewitz-Information 2/2004 (Hamburg, 2004). 
89 
ideological goals and the unintended civil-military consequences of an ever-
expanding cohort of combatants of all kinds. That is, the big bang that proli-
ferates nationalist fervor beyond a circumscribed, professionally limited 
corps of soldiers also eradicates the boundary between external and internal 
enemies and the traditional battle fields of the past as the definition of war 
and military ethos is transformed in turn. In a state of permanent ideological 
war on an imperial scale, the tendency for irregular military formations to 
wage such war on variegated battlefields, be they at home or overseas, 
forms an important phenomenon worthy of civil-military reflection. Surely this 
insight stares back at us from the dead visages of SS men in their glory of 





In the United States, however, in the midst of the so-called Global War On 
Terror, reference to the past in the knotted issues of the limits of military 
professionalism, nationalism, internal war, and irregular military formations 
generally become mired in polemics that call into question one’s patriotism. 
This phenomenon of name calling hardly casts much light on the needs of 
the present crisis. Rather, most strategic scrutiny is marred by the assertion, 
in the first instance, that the present conflict is sui generis, and thus compar-
isons as means of analysis are but scarcely possible. This self-contained 
argument poorly advances urgent civil-military understanding. Moreover, the 
body of literature of European civil-military relations that emerged from the 
enlargement of NATO forms a mediocre point of departure since 11 Sep-
tember 2001, because of its technocratic, essentially peace-time managerial 
cast of mind had, until recently, been based, overwhelmingly, on the rigors of 
peacetime planning and executive/legislative interactions. 
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The civil-military implications of the present crisis have yet to show them-
selves fully, but to be sure the business-as-usual, defense and security sec-
tor reforms of central Europe that characterized the 1990s must branch out 
beyond the Congressional Budget Office and Planning, Programming and 
Management System dicta of democratic civil-military relations and security 
sector reform. Nor do facile and finally pointless contrasts between the stra-
tegic ideal of the second world war and the failures of the Indochina enligh-
ten the seeker of strategic truths. Rather, the manner in which nationalism, 
the proliferation of fighting front into the home front, scientific racism, and the 
role of declasse soldiers who find a new outlet for organizations violence 
formed a horrific amalgam. Statesmen, soldiers and theorist must confront a 
messier, darker and more violence laden frame of civil-military reference as 
they consider the statecraft, society and the use of arms to defeat bin Laden-
ist terror on a world wide scale. The Order of the Death’s Head stands for 
the extreme limit of the perversion of military professionalism swept up in 
imperial ambitions amid a civil war that becomes a world war.35 
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